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The Balkans’ New Political Dynamics
Lost beneath the bloody headlines from Afghanistan, Darfur, Iraq and 
Lebanon is the fact that 2006 was the most important year for the Balkans 
since Slobodan Milošević’s overthrow in 2000. In June 2006, Montenegro 
declared its independence, and the process to determine Kosovo’s future 
status has entered its last stages. Together, these developments represent 
the final fall of Tito’s Yugoslavia, a process which began back in 1991. Since 
July, parliamentary elections have been held in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mace-
donia and Montenegro. In November, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, 
and Serbia were invited to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), and in 
Bosnia constitutional reform is also on the agenda. 
All of these changes are taking place at a time when strategic un-
certainty in southeastern Europe is increasing because Washington and 
Brussels are consumed by problems elsewhere and Russia is increasingly 
asserting its political and economic interests in the region. Balkan stabil-
ity over the past seven years has rested on three pillars – a significant U.S. 
military presence, the foreseeable prospect of E.U. accession for the Balkan 
countries, and the fact that political elites in Belgrade, Banja Luka, Skopje, 
and Zagreb support the political and territorial status quo in the region. 
Two of these three pillars – the U.S. military presence and the foreseeable 
prospect of E.U. accession – are either being withdrawn, or pushed back 
to an increasingly distant future. The few remaining U.S. troops in Bosnia 
were pulled out in 2006, and a similar withdrawal is planned for Kosovo 
in the near future. Both moves reveal the mindset of bureaucratic planners 
who know the price of everything and the value of nothing. Meanwhile, 
the Europeans are suffering from too many of their own problems to guide 
the Balkan states successfully through the transition process, and are unable 
to provide firm assurances as to when the next round of enlargement that 
would include the Balkan states might take place. Hence, there is a signifi-
cant danger that international policy toward the region could founder for 
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The third pillar of Balkan stability – the status quo elites in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia – is somewhat wobbly as well. Politi-
cal forces challenging the current status quo in the region, whether in the 
form of politicians in Sarajevo demanding a radical revision of the Dayton 
Peace Accords, or revanchists in the Serbian Radical Party who still dream 
of creating a “Greater Serbia,” or militant Albanian movements threatening 
to destabilize Macedonia, Montenegro, or southern Serbia, all to greater or 
lesser degrees are waiting on the sidelines to see how quickly changing facts 
on the ground may play to their advantage.
Additionally, an important new variable has been introduced into the 
Balkan strategic equation – the re-emergence of Russia as an important 
economic and political player in the region. In Montenegro, Russians have 
bought the republic’s largest industrial enterprise; in Bosnia, the largest oil 
refinery; in Macedonia, Lukoil is planning a major expansion of its opera-
tions; in Serbia, Russia is providing the capital to refurbish the hydro-elec-
tric plant at the Iron Gates of the Danube, Serbia’s main source of electric-
ity; and in March, Russian President Vladimir Putin traveled to Greece to 
sign an agreement with his Bulgarian and Greek counterparts to build a 
new pipeline to carry Russian oil from the Black Sea to the Aegean.
Given all of these developments, the current political moment in the 
Balkans bears a disconcerting resemblance to the situation that obtained 
in 1991 when the Yugoslav crisis first began. Then, as now, rapidly chang-
ing political realities on the ground in southeastern Europe came at a mo-
ment when Washington and European capitals were distracted by problems 
elsewhere – the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, and German reunification – and belated American and European 
reactions to the accelerating dynamic of disintegration and violence were 
unable to keep the lid on a rapidly changing situation.
To be sure, there is little danger that the large scale violence of the 
1990s that ravaged Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo will again 
erupt in the western or southern Balkans. New security mechanisms and 
instruments – many developed specifically in response to the original out-
break of violence in the former Yugoslavia – are now in place, and there is 
much more recognition of the need for quick, preventive diplomacy in the 
early stages of a crisis than there was in the early 1990s.
Nevertheless, the problems facing the region should be neither un-
derestimated nor dismissed, and after fifteen years of intensive international 
engagement in the region, there is no excuse for Washington and Brussels 
to be behind the curve. While Montenegrin independence and a resolution 
of Kosovo’s future status may clarify some things in southeastern Europe, 
they also open up a host of other issues – the futures of Macedonia, Bos-
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weak, economically impoverished states lacking internal political legitimacy 
will find the strength both to adopt political and economic reforms and 
to deal with powerful organized crime syndicates and the infiltration of 
Islamic militant groups.1
Moreover, it is not at all clear that the new security structures in 
place will be strong enough to counteract the powerful forces now being 
unleashed in the region. Maintaining peace and stability and promoting 
economic and political reform in the Balkans while simultaneously redraw-
ing borders and creating new states will not be easy to achieve, especially at 
a time when Washington’s and Brussels’ ability to control developments on 
the ground is decreasing in direct relationship to their drawdown in troops 
and financial aid, and the only carrot on offer is the increasingly distant 
prospect of E.U. accession.
For these reasons, many implicit assumptions about Balkan policy 
currently holding sway on both sides of the Atlantic are seriously flawed. In 
Washington, the prevailing sentiment is that we can grant Kosovo indepen-
dence, revise Bosnia’s constitutional structure, declare victory, and pull out of 
southeastern Europe. In Brussels, many quarters believe that southeastern 
Europe’s E.U. integration aspirations can wait until the E.U. settles its own 
internal difficulties. But the new political dynamics of the region unleashed 
by the changes of the past year means that at this moment the Balkans can-
not afford benign neglect. The International Commission on the Balkans 
warned in 2005 that we are as close to failure in southeastern Europe as we 
are to success.2 The judgment still holds true, and while American policy-
makers may be able to tick off many of the items on their Balkan agenda in 
the coming months, what they want most – a responsible way to disengage 
from the Balkans – will remain unattainable.
The good news is that maintaining stability and promoting reform 
in the Balkans can be done for a fraction of the cost of the Afghan and 
Iraqi operations, and in a region where Americans are popular and everyone 
wants to join the European club. But stability and progress will not emerge 
by themselves, which is why understanding the new political dynamics un-
leashed by quickly changing facts on the ground in southeastern Europe 
is crucial. The nature of the questions hovering over the Balkans reveals 
the continued seriousness of the situation: What will happen in Bosnia if 
and when the Office of the High Representative (OHR) shuts down? Can 
1 On the problems facing Eastern Europe as a whole, see F. Stephen Larrabee, “Danger 
and Opportunity in Eastern Europe”, Foreign Affairs 85, no. 6 (November-December 
2006), 117-131. 
2 “The Balkans in Europe’s Future”, Report of the International Commission on the 
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Kosovo and Montenegro succeed as independent states? Will the Ohrid 
Accords (and, by extension, Macedonia itself) work? Will Serbia’s post-
Milosevic reform process continue? At this political juncture, in many ways 
the answers to these questions lie more in Washington and Brussels than in 
the region itself. 
Montenegro – Independence without Exceptionalism?
For the past fifteen years, Montenegro has prided itself, with some justi-
fication, as being an exception to the general Balkan rule of ethnic het-
erogeneity leading to ethnic conflict. Paradoxically, however, the thesis of 
Montenegrin exceptionalism faces its greatest challenge now that Monte-
negro has become independent. Last May, Montenegrins approved an in-
dependence referendum by a 55-45 percent margin, but a glance behind the 
45,000 vote difference suggests the future of Montenegrin politics will be 
anything but smooth. Voting was strictly along ethnic lines, with Albanians, 
Croats, Muslims (recognized as a distinct ethnic group in many parts of 
the Balkans) and ethnic Montenegrins voting overwhelmingly in favor of 
independence, while Montenegrin citizens identifying themselves as Serbs 
(over thirty percent of the population) voted just as strongly in favor of 
maintaining the state union with Serbia.
Independence, however, significantly changes the political game that 
all of these groups have been playing in recent years. Most of Montene-
gro’s  ethnic  minorities  have  supported  Montenegrin  independence  not 
out of any particular loyalty to the Montenegrin state itself, but primarily 
to break Montenegro’s ties with Serbia. Now that that has been achieved, 
Montenegro’s various ethnic groups have already begun to up the ante in 
Montenegrin politics by demanding more autonomy and greater collective 
group rights.3 And as repeatedly seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedo-
nia, such ethnically-based politics make it extremely difficult to achieve the 
consensus needed to adopt and implement political and economic reform. 
Two recent events sharply bring into focus this lack of consensus in 
Montenegrin society. In September 2007, on the eve of parliamentary elec-
tions, Montenegrin security forces arrested over a dozen ethnic Albanians 
for planning an alleged terrorist plot. Two of those arrested were local mu-
nicipal council members, showing the relatively shallow support even some 
Albanian government officials have for an independent Montenegrin state. 
On the other side of the political and ethnic spectrum, meanwhile, just a 
3 For an analysis along these lines, see Misa Djurkovic, “Montenegro: Headed for New 
Divisions?” (Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Conflict Studies Research 
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few days later, at the inaugural session of the Montenegrin parliament on 
October 2nd, Serb members of parliament refused to stand for the singing 
of the Montenegrin national anthem, yet another subtle indication of the 
weak foundations on which Montenegrin independence rests.
Montenegro, clearly, will face several years of difficult birth pains. 
Even apart from the most basic question of the new state’s legitimacy in the 
eyes of many of its citizens, Montenegro faces enormous economic difficul-
ties. Less than a fifth of the population is officially employed, governmental 
corruption is high even by regional standards, and there is a serious debate 
within the country over the wisdom of relying so heavily on Russian invest-
ment in the republic. Adding to all of this uncertainty is Djukanović’s deci-
sion to step down as prime minister and retire from politics. To his credit, 
Djukanović achieved many things while he was in power. His decision to 
break with Milošević in 1997 was an important blow to Milošević’s aura of 
omnipotence, and he kept his cool during NATO’s air campaign against 
the then Yugoslavia in 1999. Crowning these achievements was his role in 
peacefully guiding a deeply divided state to independence.
But the price of many of these things has yet to be paid. Putting 
together a coalition of groups with convergent short-term tactical goals but 
contradictory long-term strategic goals can win an independence referen-
dum, but it will not make for a stable state. Similarly, the social and eco-
nomic costs of Djukanović’s struggle to keep himself and his party in power, 
in terms of the significant criminalization of the Montenegrin state and 
society, is something that Montenegro will continue to pay for for many 
years to come. 
Bosnia after the OHR
To Montenegro’s north, the spillover effects of its independence referen-
dum were immediately visible in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina. Eleven 
years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, in 2006 Bosnia had its 
most heated election campaign since the end of the country’s civil war in 
1995. Within days of the Montenegrin referendum, the prime minister of 
the Serbian entity in Bosnia, the Republika Srpska (or RS), Milorad Dodik, 
aired the possibility of the Bosnian Serbs holding their own referendum on 
independence if Muslim politicians in Sarajevo continued with their attacks 
on the legitimacy of the RS. Dodik’s threats clearly struck a nerve among 
Bosnia’s Serb population, as Dodik and his Independent Social Democratic 
Party scored a huge victory in Bosnia’s October presidential and parliamen-
tary elections, becoming by far the most important political force in the 
Serb half of Bosnia. Elections in the other half of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
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Haris Silajdžić, the Bosnian Muslim wartime prime minister, was elected 
to the tripartite state presidency after several years out of politics, while a 
Croat from Sarajevo, Željko Komšić, was elected as the Croat member of 
the presidency, apparently with the help of thousands of Muslim votes, and 
without the support of Bosnia’s leading Croat political parties.
This new political constellation in Bosnia has emerged at an impor-
tant crossroads for Bosnia’s future development. Last April, constitutional 
reform proposals supported by Washington and Brussels and most political 
parties in Bosnia failed after Silajdžić and his party refused to endorse them, 
thereby sabotaging years of delicate political negotiations intended to pro-
vide a new, post-Dayton political framework for Bosnia.4 Political tensions 
in Bosnia are sure to increase over the next few years as Dodik and Silajdžić 
– two sharp-tongued, strong-willed individuals – fight over their contrast-
ing visions of Bosnia’s future. For the first time since the war, one of Bosnia’s 
leading journalists, Senad Pećanin, has become concerned enough to say “I 
am afraid for the peace here.”5
While a return to large-scale conflict in Bosnia is unlikely, there is 
clearly no consensus among the peoples of Bosnia as to how their state 
should be organized or governed. Eleven years into the Dayton Peace Pro-
cess, however, many observers are questioning the intrusive role internation-
al actors are playing in Bosnia’s domestic politics. The High Representative’s 
current powers, which include the ability to impose legislation and remove 
publicly elected officials from office, has prevented Bosnians from taking 
responsibility for their own affairs, and the strong role of the High Rep-
resentative or the American ambassador in Sarajevo has often convinced 
Bosnia’s Croat, Muslim, and Serb political leaders that it is more important 
to gain the support of international officials than that of their fellow Bos-
nians. The perverse result has been the introduction of a negative dynamic 
into Bosnia’s political life, preventing Bosnia’s Croats, Muslims and Serbs 
from developing the habits of mutual trust, cooperation, and compromise 
needed for the country to progress on its own, and absolving Bosnia’s politi-
cians from responsibility for the country’s future.
Eleven years after the end of the war, and after one of the most inten-
sive and large-scale international engagements in history, making Bosnia-
Herzegovina a viable state from this point on is going to depend upon the 
Bosnian peoples themselves. The best the international community can do 
4 See the testimony by Daniel Server, “Balkans Progress: Who Stands in the Way?”, 
before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Hearing on Human 
Rights, Democracy and Integration in South-Central Europe, June 15, 2006
5 Andrew Purvis, “Can Bosnia’s Peace Survive?”, Time (European Edition), 2 October 
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is provide a secure environment in which Bosnian politics can evolve and 
play out free from the threat of civil war, foreign military intervention, or 
threats to secede or partition the country. Apart from these ground rules, 
however, few people believe that continued international micromanagement 
can do much to promote further interethnic reconciliation in Bosnia. In the 
next phase of Bosnia’s post-Dayton development, this will have to be up to 
Bosnia’s politicians and peoples themselves. 
Kosovo – Toward Independence?
Of  all  the  problems  facing  southeastern  Europe  and  the  international 
community, the most difficult and potentially dangerous remains deciding 
Kosovo’s future status. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, which for-
mally regulated the end of the Kosovo war in 1999, left Kosovo legally a 
part of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but practically a United 
Nations/NATO protectorate. Driven by a belief that Kosovo’s internation-
al-legal limbo status could not be prolonged indefinitely, but also by the fear 
that Albanian dissatisfaction with the status quo could result in an explo-
sion of violent discontent directed against international personnel in Koso-
vo, negotiations over Kosovo’s future status began last February. Predictably, 
however, they made practically no progress in bridging the gap between 
Belgrade and Priština, with the result being that the U.N. Security Council 
will have to impose a solution on the two parties. Most observers believe 
that the imposed solution will remove Kosovo from Belgrade’s sovereignty 
and grant it some form of independence.
Whatever is done in Kosovo, however, is almost certain to have wide-
spread ramifications. Russian president Vladimir Putin has publicly warned 
that whatever happens in Kosovo could serve as a precedent for similar 
unresolved territorial conflicts in the former Soviet Union, most especially 
in Georgia’s breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and in 
Moldova’s Transdniestria region, and Putin has specifically called for the 
application of “universal principles” to the Kosovo case. Many regional lead-
ers, especially in Romania and Greece, have also raised concerns about plans 
to impose a solution that has not been agreed to by the two parties.
More immediately, however, whatever legal form Kosovo’s future sta-
tus takes, it will do little to resolve Kosovo’s fundamental internal problems: 
extremely weak governmental capacity, a moribund economy with few seri-
ous opportunities for growth, pervasive corruption and organized crime, a 
fractionalized political system based on regional and clan loyalties, and an 
intolerant nationalist xenophobia against non-Albanian ethnic communi-
ties that has produced the worst human rights situation in Europe. In 2005, 
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presence in Kosovo will only worsen economic conditions. Moreover, with 
half of Kosovo’s population under the age of 26 (and one third under the age 
of 17), the vast majority of whom account for the 50-60 percent of Kosovo’s 
population that is officially unemployed, the potentially explosive social 
consequences of the situation are clear. Compounding all of these problems 
is the fact that Kosovo already has its own frozen conflict – the Serb enclave 
north of the Ibar river, anchored by the divided city of Mitrovica. Here, in 
territory adjoining Serbia proper, some 80,000 Serbs are practically more a 
part of Serbia than they are of Kosovo.
Clearly, a continued international (and particularly U.S.) presence 
will be needed in Kosovo for several more years. Whatever form Kosovo’s 
future status ultimately takes, it remains to be seen whether it will in fact 
promote regional stability, or whether it will merely begin destabilizing 
neighboring states such as Macedonia, Montenegro, and southern Serbia. 
Extremists in Kosovo have already been implicated in fomenting violence 
in all of these areas, and without a strong U.S. presence, it is doubtful that a 
European force would have the credibility to reign in any potential extrem-
ist violence. 
Macedonia after Kosovo 
In many ways, the political logic of Balkan nationalism – succinctly summed 
up by Vladimir Gligorov in the saying “Why should I be a minority in your 
country when you can be a minority in mine?” – suggests that Macedonia 
will have the most difficult time dealing with the new strategic environment 
in the southern Balkans if and when Kosovo is granted independence. With 
three million Albanians living in an independent state to its west, and a 
further two million Albanians living in an independent state to its north, it 
is difficult to see why 500,000 Albanians in Macedonia will remain satisfied 
in a state in which they claim they are discriminated against and treated as 
second-class citizens. Moreover, there is no evidence of such a political situ-
ation succeeding in the Balkans at any time over the past several decades. 
The Bosnian experience shows how difficult it is to make a multi-ethnic 
state work even when the main ethnic groups speak a common language, 
and in Macedonia the ethnic divide is further deepened by the fact that 
state’s main ethnic groups speak mutually unintelligible languages.6
Macedonia’s  parliamentary  elections  in  July  showed  how  frag-
ile Macedonia remains five years after a civil war between Albanians and 
Macedonian Slavs was narrowly averted. When the right-of-center Internal 
6 It should be noted, however, that many Albanians in Macedonia do speak Macedo-
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Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party of Macedo-
nian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) chose to invite a smaller Albanian 
party to join its ruling coalition in place of the largest Albanian political 
party in Macedonia, Ali Ahmeti’s Democratic Union of Albanians (DUI), 
Ahmeti’s followers took to the streets, raising roadblocks in many parts of 
the country and boycotting parliament for two months. On the other side 
of the ethnic divide, in August the Macedonian government again arrested 
a Christian Orthodox cleric, Bishop Jovan Vraniševski, who has re-estab-
lished ties with the Serbian Orthodox Church in Belgrade. Bishop Jovan, 
named a prisoner of conscience by Amnesty International, has been subject 
to various forms of intimidation and harassment over the past several years, 
including being charged with crimes as petty as performing a baptism in his 
apartment. As these events suggest, Macedonia’s social and political cohe-
sion remains weak, and without strong international support it is doubtful 
that Macedonia would have the internal strength to weather the changes 
facing southeastern Europe in the coming years. 
Stabilizing Serbia
Any American policymaker who has bemoaned the fact that Washington is 
a one-crisis-at-a-time town should have some sympathy for the problems 
confronting Belgrade politicians. As a result of Montenegro’s declaration of 
independence, Serbia has involuntarily become an independent country, a 
decision which grants Kosovo some form of independence will reduce its 
territory by a further fifteen percent, and the E.U. has suspended talks with 
Belgrade because of its failure to apprehend Hague indictee Ratko Mladić. 
And these are just the “big” problems; others, such as judicial and security 
sector reform, providing for the largest refugee population in Europe, or 
rebuilding an economy in which unemployment hovers at 30 percent and 
another decade will be needed for per capita GDP to reach 1989 levels also 
remain to be solved.
Given these realities, what is noteworthy is not that reform in post-
Milošević Serbia has been slow, but that the post-Milošević reform effort 
is making any progress at all. In many ways, however, the coming years will 
be the most severe test of Serbia’s nascent democratic institutions, which is 
why there is an urgent need to rethink current U.S. and E.U. policy towards 
the country.
For the past several years, much of Washington’s and Brussels’ rela-
tions with Serbia – such as negotiations with the E.U. over a Stabilization 
and Association Agreement, or Serbia’s membership in NATO’s Partner-
ship for Peace – have been reduced to the fate of one man, former Bosnian 
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Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and widely believed 
to be the man most responsible for the Srebrenica massacres in July 1995 
in which several thousand Bosnian Muslims were killed. But while the 
morality of insisting on Mladić’s arrest and extradition is unassailable, the 
consequences of freezing Serbia’s Euro-Atlantic integration efforts because 
of one individual have become detrimental to long-term stability in the 
Balkans. As one op-ed contributor in the New York Times asked, “How im-
portant is Mladić’s arrest balanced against the integration of eight million 
people in a region that badly needs stability?”7
In  similar  instances,  Washington  and  Brussels  have  both  shown 
greater understanding for the wider strategic issues at stake. In October 
2005, for instance, the European Union gave Croatia a green light to pro-
ceed with E.U. accession talks only days after ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla 
del Ponte announced her disappointment with the Croatian government’s 
lack of cooperation in the case of fugitive Hague indictee Ante Gotovi-
na. Similarly, the ICTY is allowing another indicted war criminal, former 
Kosovo prime minister Ramush Haradinaj, to await trial from his home in 
Kosovo (despite the fact that Haradinaj has reportedly been intimidating 
and harassing potential witnesses against him) because of the belief that 
Haradinaj can reign in extremists in Kosovo.8 In both cases, larger stra-
tegic concerns have required that some unpleasant compromises be made 
between the just and the good. Washington, Brussels, and the ICTY now 
confront the same situation with regard to Mladić. Fortunately, Washing-
ton made a good move in this direction at NATO’s November summit in 
Riga when it agreed to invite Serbia (along with Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Montenegro) to join PfP. The E.U. now needs to show similar pragmatism 
in supporting democratic forces in Serbia by restarting accession talks with 
Serbia as soon as possible.
Serbia’s neighbors certainly understand the importance of such prag-
matism. As Kosovo Prime Minister Agim Ceku recently noted, “the in-
ternational community needs to find a way to stimulate democratic Serbia 
while sidelining the radicals.”9 Sidelining the “radicals” in this case most 
especially means that Washington should reconsider its policy of avoiding 
all dealings with the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), whose leader, Vojislav 
Šešelj, is currently on trial for war crimes in The Hague. The SRS is known 
for its extremist rhetoric and little else, but in a country with so many refu-
7 See Timothy William Waters, “Why Insist on the Surrender of Ratko Mladic?”, The 
New York Times, 12 May 2006, p. A33.
8 See, for instance, Nicholas Wood, “Kosovo War-Crimes Trials Splits West and Pros-
ecutors”, The New York Times, 8 April 2007.
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gees and a devastated economy they can count on the support of anywhere 
between 30-35 percent of the electorate, and there is a serious possibility 
that if Kosovo is granted independence its support could increase substan-
tially. American officials refuse to deal with SRS officials, but this is a policy 
whose logic is becoming weaker and weaker. The SRS is not monolithic: it 
has extreme and moderate factions, and initiating even low level contacts 
with the party will move the moderates into a more responsible, mainstream 
direction and marginalize the extremists, which will be of considerable ben-
efit to domestic Serbian politics. A more flexible U.S. policy can speed this 
process along, and the sooner this is done, the better.
Stabilizing  Serbia  –  and,  by  extension,  southeastern  Europe  as  a 
whole – requires a new approach to dealing with Belgrade. Just like generals 
fighting the last war, however, far too many policymakers in Washington 
and some European capitals have yet to recognize that Slobodan Milošević 
is dead and the challenge for U.S. and E.U. policy when dealing with Bel-
grade today is different from that of the 1990s. Then, the task was contain-
ing a malevolent dictator; today, the challenge is to foster an international 
environment that will guarantee the success of the democratic transition in 
what is strategically the most important country in the Balkans. The assas-
sination of former Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjić in March 2003 
should be a tragic reminder of the difficulties and dangers post-Milošević 
political forces in Belgrade are facing. They need American and European 
understanding and support.    
Historical Opportunities
Richard Holbrooke often points out that U.S. and E.U. engagement in 
the region is about more than altruism. Problems in southeastern Europe 
quickly become European problems, and European problems, sooner or 
later, create problems for American security interests. To take but one ex-
ample: several of the September 11 hijackers had been trained or fought 
in Bosnia in the 1990s, and for this and many other reasons Washington 
has a strong interest in the region, and in seeing the Balkans transition and 
integration process through to a successful conclusion.
Doing so, however, will require devoting more attention to the re-
gion than either Washington or Brussels currently seem willing to do. One 
of Europe’s most knowledgeable Balkan hands, Swedish foreign minister 
Carl Bildt, has warned that if the E.U.’s doors are closed to the remaining 
Balkan states it would “take away the guiding beacon which has guided the 
reform policies of the region for the past few years. Instead of the magnet 
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the region driven by the fears and prejudices of nationalism.”10 Jacques Paul 
Klein, another old Balkan hand, puts the issue facing the EU in the follow-
ing terms – either the E.U. accelerates the western Balkans’ accession to the 
union, or these countries enter the E.U. on their own – one person at a time. 
As former Macedonian prime minister Vlado Bučkovski has expressed the 
concerns of many Balkan political leaders, absent a clear timetable from 
the E.U. as to when the various countries of the Western Balkans may join, 
“it will be very difficult for us pro-Western and pro-European reformers to 
continue the political fight.”11
At the moment, many regional leaders are closely watching to see 
how the E.U. deals with Croatia’s membership bid. Croatia is by most mea-
sures a more suitable candidate for E.U. membership than either Bulgaria 
or Romania, so the problem in integrating Croatia is more a matter of in-
ternal E.U. politics than of Croatia’s political or economic suitability. All 
of these things combined – accelerating Croatia’s E.U. accession timetable, 
stabilizing Serbia and providing support to its democratic forces, continu-
ing to provide strong security guarantees to all the states in the region and 
giving them foreseeable prospects for joining the E.U. – will go a long way 
to ensuring that the transition process in the Balkans is successful.
While much can still go wrong in southeastern Europe, the current 
political moment also presents a very rare historical opportunity. For the 
first time in centuries, the region is not divided between rival empires or 
power blocs, and all the Balkan states share the same foreign and domestic 
policy goals – internally, political democratization and the creation of mar-
ket economies, and externally, integration into NATO, the E.U. and other 
Euro-Atlantic institutions. Whether these efforts succeed or fail largely 
depends on decisions that will be made outside the region. What is clear, 
however, is that this is a rare political moment when historical change can 
be accomplished in the Balkans for a relatively modest price. 
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